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Abstract 
 Impact of the ability and the degree of openness of a manager on decision making is 
studied.  Whether a more able manager increases or decreases the effort of a subordinate depends 
on the relative quality of information.  Greater openness is a two-edged sword: it increases the 
likelihood that more information will be employed, but it reduces the manager’s incentive to 
expend effort on obtaining better information.  A more open manager is more desirable when the 
position is relatively more important or the prior information is not very accurate. 
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1. Introduction 
Managerial decision making is very important for various kinds of organizations.  
Companies spend significant amount of resources to find CEOs to match their needs.  As a 
manager plays a leading role to his subordinates, the ability of a manager is a concern.2  Even 
though a manager has a high level of ability, he usually does not have the time or sufficient 
amount of information to make a decision.  Thus whether a manager is open to opinions of others 
is relevant to the quality of the decision made.3  There are some interesting questions about 
managerial decision making.  First, how is the behavior of a manager affected by his ability and 
his degree of openness?  Second, how is the behavior of subordinates affected by the 
                                                 
1 We thank Vinod Agarwal, John Chao, Leo Michelis, David Selover, Daniel Vincent, John M. Virgo, Gilbert 
Yochum, and anonymous referees for their valuable suggestions.  We are solely responsible for the mistakes. 
2  The importance of ability of a leader is discussed in detail in Selznick (1957).  The more uncertain the 
environment a firm operates in, the more important the role of a manager as a leader. 
3 For an example of the importance of listening to the opinions of subordinates, see Chandler (1990, p. 207)’s 
discussion of Henry Ford’s management of the Ford Company.  Henry Ford fired his most capable managers and 
tried to administer his empire personally and “the result was disastrous.” 
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personalities of the managers?  Third, what kind of personality is desirable for a manager?  
Finally, if we have to choose among different merits of good manager, which merit is most 
desirable? 
In this paper, we study the impact of the ability and the degree of openness of a manager 
on decision making.  A manager plays many roles, such as decision making, supervision of 
subordinates, and participation in production directly.  Here we emphasize the decision making 
role of a manager rather than other roles of a manager.  For a manager with a large number of 
subordinates, this emphasis on decision making is appropriate.  For example, for the CEO of the 
General Motors, whether to keep or develop a new brand of cars is much more important than to 
engage in the production of cars directly.  One contribution of this paper is that we study the 
information aggregation role of a manager in a formal model.  In this paper, a manager needs to 
estimate the true value of a parameter.  A manager may rely on his information only or also 
consult the information of his subordinates.  A more able manager is modeled as a manager with 
a more precise estimate of the parameter needed for decision making.  A more open manager is 
modeled as a manager who is more likely to consult subordinates for information. 
First, when the degree of precision is exogenous and a leader chooses the number of 
followers optimally, we show that a more able manager consults a lower number of subordinates.  
The number of subordinates consulted does not change with the degree of openness of the 
manager.  Second, when the number of subordinates is exogenously given and the level of 
precision is determined by effort level, a sufficient condition for the manager’s effort to increase 
and the subordinate’s effort to decrease with the ability of the manager is that the quality of prior 
information is relatively good.  When the manager is more open, the effort of the manager 
decreases and the effort of a subordinate increases.  Third, we study the case that both the 
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number of subordinates and the level of precision are optimally chosen.  We show that a less 
open manager exerts a higher level of effort.  A higher level of prior precision decreases the 
effort level of the manager.  When prior information is relatively accurate, the number of 
subordinates consulted decreases with the ability of the manager and the effort of the manager 
increases.  Overall, a more capable manager is more desirable.  Interestingly, decision cost is not 
a monotonic function of the degree of openness.  When the decision stake is low, it may be 
profitable to choose a less open manager to save the wage cost paid to subordinates.  When the 
prior information is relatively inaccurate, it is more desirable to have a more open manager. 
In the literature on a manager’s vision, Rotemberg and Saloner (1993) have studied a 
model in which contracts between the firm and mangers are incomplete.  In Rotemberg and 
Saloner (2000), a manager with a vision biases him in favor of certain projects.  This affects the 
type of projects implemented and thus affects the incentives of subordinates because 
subordinates can be compensated for their innovative ideas only when their ideas get 
implemented.  In Van den Steen (2005), after knowing the preferences of the managers, workers 
choose companies to work for.  A manager with strong beliefs about the right course of action 
will attract subordinates with similar beliefs.  This alignment of beliefs between managers and 
workers in the same company gives direction to the firm and affects incentives and coordination.  
In the above models, the role of a manager is significantly different from that in this paper. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  First, we specify the model.  Second, we 
examine the optimal choice of the number of subordinates when the degree of precision is 
exogenously given.  Third, we address the impact of ability and openness on behavior when 
higher effort levels improve the degree of precision.  Fourth, we study effort levels when the 
number of subordinates and the level of precision are all optimally chosen.  Optimal selection of 
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a manager is also discussed.  Finally, we discuss some generalizations of the model and 
conclude. 
 
2. Specification of the Model 
In this section, we specify the model.  There is a manager and a pool of subordinates.  A 
decision needs to be made and the quality of the decision depends on the estimation of the true 
value of an unknown parameter  .  The decision may be whether to initiate a new investment 
project.  The parameter to be estimated is the profitability of the project.  There are alternative 
interpretations of the manager and the subordinates.  For example, the configuration can be a 
president deciding how many advisors to consult before making a decision.   
The prior belief about the parameter   is that it follows a normal distribution with mean 
  and a specified value of the precision  , 0 .4  Let   denote a positive constant.  The 
manager has one observation with a precision of mp , where mp  is a positive number.5  A 
manager with a higher value of   is viewed as more capable or with a higher level of ability.  
There is an unlimited supply of subordinates.  The number of subordinates actually consulted by 
the manager is n .  It is assumed that observations between the manager and any subordinate are 
independent.  It is also assumed that observations among subordinates are also independent.  
Each subordinate has one observation with a precision of sp , 0sp . 
                                                 
4 For a normal distribution, the precision is the inverse of the variance.  Here precision rather than variance is used 
because the usage of precision simplifies presentation. 
5 By having this compound term of precision, later on we are able to separate the impact of a change of ability 
through   and a change of effort through me  then mp . 
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The manager is assumed to be risk neutral and his objective is to minimize the total cost 
which is the sum of the decision loss and the opportunity cost of the manager and possible 
payments to subordinates.  For a  denoting a positive constant, the loss function is assumed to be 
quadratic: 2)( 

a .  Here, 

  is the estimation of the parameter. As argued in DeGroot (1970, p. 
228), when the loss depends only on the difference 

, a motivation of using the quadratic 
loss form is that it is an acceptable approximation in a wide variety of situations.6  Let X  
denotes the amount of information available.  From DeGroot (1970), it can be shown that the 
Bayes decision to minimize the quadratic function is given by )( E

.  With this decision rule, 
the minimum loss is )][var(* XE   . 
For ]1,0[t , suppose that the manager uses both his information and the information 
from his subordinates t  percent of the time and uses his information only for the rest of the time.  
The value of t  is determined by the personality of the manager and it may be viewed as the style 
of the manager.  Here, t  is a parameter used to measure the manager’s degree of openness or 
tolerance ( t  stands for tolerance).  With this view in mind, t  is assumed to be exogenous in this 
model.  When t  is equal to zero, the manager does not put any weight on the information 
gathered by the subordinates.  In this case, the manager is viewed as not open.  This possibility 
                                                 
6 In reality, the penalty to the manager for erring in one direction in predicting the parameter can be larger than in 
the other direction.  For example, in the case of profitability of a project, overestimation might be a worse loss than 
underestimation.  We thank an anonymous referee for this insight.  This type of loss can be addressed by a loss 
function depending on the absolute value of error.  Minimizing a least square loss is easier to handle than 
minimizing least absolute value because there is a kink in the absolute loss function and this makes differentiation 
less convenient. 
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can be rationalized by arguing that the manager does not trust the information provided by the 
subordinates.  When t  is equal to one, the manager puts equal weight on his own observation 
and the observation provided by the subordinates.  In this case, the manager is viewed as 
completely open.  This configuration can apply when the manager views himself as a member of 
a committee and each member of the committee plays equal role.  With the above specification, 
the degree of openness increases with t .  The manager knows the value of t  himself.  The 
manager may also determine the number of subordinates to consult. 
Total cost is the sum of expected loss and the opportunity cost of the manager and 
payment to the subordinates.  The opportunity cost of the manager is u .  The wage rate paid to a 
subordinate is w .  When the manager relies on his own information only, the manager will set 
the estimation equal to the expected value and the posterior precision is mp   and the 
decision risk is )/( mpa   .  No payment to followers needs to be made.  When the manager 
relies on both his information and the n  subordinates, the manager will set the estimation equal 
to the expected value and the posterior precision is sm pnp   and the decision risk is 
)/( sm nppa  .  The wage cost is wn .  Thus the total expected cost for a manager with a 
degree of openness t  is equal to 
    wntu
pnp
ta
p
ta
smm






)1( .          (1) 
 In the following three sections, we study the impact of the manager’s ability and the 
degree of openness under different configurations. 
 
3. Optimal Choice of the Number of Subordinates 
 In this section, the levels of the precisions of individuals are exogenous. 
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The manager chooses the number of subordinates to consult to minimize total expected 
cost.  From (1), the first order condition for the optimal choice of the number of subordinates is 
    0
)( 2



sm
s
pnp
pa
w

.7           (2) 
 The following proposition studies the impact of the ability of the manager on the number 
of subordinates consulted. 
 
 Proposition 1: When the level of precision is exogenous, a more able manager consults a 
lower number of subordinates. 
 Proof: From (2), it can be shown that 0
/
/ 


nd
nd 

. 
 
 The intuition behind Proposition 1 is that the marginal benefit of consulting a subordinate 
decreases when a manager becomes more able.  As a result, the number of subordinates 
consulted decreases.  
 The following proposition studies the degree of openness of the manager on the number 
of subordinates consulted. 
 
 Proposition 2: When the levels of precisions are exogenous, the number of subordinates 
does not change with the degree of openness of a manager. 
 Proof: From (2), it can be shown that 0/ dtdn . 
 
                                                 
7 In equation (2), t  disappears from the equation by dividing through by t .  It can be checked that the second order 
condition for cost minimization is always satisfied. 
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 The intuition behind Proposition 2 is as follows.  Once a manager decides to consult 
followers for information, the number of subordinates consulted is determined by the marginal 
cost and marginal benefit of consulting an additional subordinate.  Since the marginal cost and 
marginal benefit are not affected by the degree of openness (see footnote 6), the number of 
subordinates consulted is not affected by the degree of openness. 
From (2), we can also establish the following results.  First, the number of subordinates 
consulted decreases with the degree of precision of the information provided by a subordinate.  
The reason is that the marginal benefit of consulting a subordinate decreases.  Second, the 
number of subordinates consulted also decreases with the wage rate since a higher wage rate 
increases the cost of consulting a subordinate.  Third, the number of subordinates consulted also 
decreases with the quality of prior information.  The reason is that a higher quality of prior 
information decreases the marginal benefit to consult a subordinate.  Finally, when the decision 
risk increases, the number of subordinates consulted increases. 
 
4. Precision Determined by Effort Level 
Since it takes time to hire new employees, for a manager in the short run, the number of 
subordinates can be viewed as fixed.  In this section, we study the case that the number of 
subordinates is exogenously given.  However, the levels of precisions are determined by effort 
level. 
The effort level of the manager is me and the effort level of a subordinate is se .  The level 
of precision of an individual is determined by effort level: )( mmm epp   and )( sss epp  .  It is 
assumed that a higher effort level improves the level of precision: 0)(' ii ep , for smi , .  This 
assumption can be illustrated as follows.  There is a prior belief of the distribution of the value of 
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 .  By exerting effort, an individual can rule out some of the possibilities and the precision of 
the distribution of   improves.  We also assume that 0)('' ii ep : the degree of precision 
increases at a decreasing rate. 
 The cost to an individual when the level of effort is ie  is )( ieC .  For smi , , it is 
assumed that 0)(' ieC  and 0)('' ieC .  That is, the cost of effort increases with the level of 
effort and the cost function is convex.  The effort level of the subordinate is assumed to be 
observable to the manager.8  In this case, the wage rate to a subordinate will be set to equal to the 
cost of effort of a subordinate.  The opportunity cost to the manager is replaced by the cost of 
exerting effort.  The manager chooses me  and se  to minimize total expected cost:   
)()(
)()()(
)1(
sm
ssmmmm
eCnteC
epnep
ta
ep
ta 





.        (3) 
The first order conditions for cost minimization with respect to efforts are 
0
)(
'
)(
')1(
)(' 221 



sm
m
m
m
m pnp
pta
p
pta
eC




,         (4) 
0
)(
'
)(' 22 

sm
l
s pnp
pa
eC

.           (5) 
                                                 
8 Here the manager controls the effort of the subordinates by providing the corresponding wage rate through the cost 
function of the subordinates.  It is assumed that the manager can control the effort of a subordinate perfectly.  In the 
principal-agent literature, the principal may observe a noisy rather than a perfect signal of the effort of the agent.  
For literature on mechanism design, see Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) and Manelli and Vincent (1995).  Suppose 
that under an optimally designed incentive scheme, the optimal effort level of a subordinate increases with the level 
of reward such as wage rate.  Then our assumption of perfect observability can be viewed as a reduced form of a 
full-fledged mechanism design model with imperfect observability. 
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 Equations (4) and (5) form a system of two equations defining me  and se  implicitly.  
Differentiation of equations (4) and (5) with respect to me , se ,  , and t  leads to 
dt
t
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 Let   denote the determinant of the above coefficient matrix.  For stability, it is 
assumed that 0 .9  The following proposition studies the impact of the manager’s ability on 
the effort levels. 
 
 Proposition 3: When the number of subordinates is exogenous, a sufficient condition for 
0/ ddem  and 0/ ddes  is that  
mp  .             (7) 
 Proof: Partial differentiation of (4) leads to 
   33
1
)(
')(
)(
'))(1(
sm
mms
m
mm
pnp
pppnta
p
ppta











. 
If (7) is valid, 0/1   .  Application of Cramer’s rule to (6) yields 











 /2121
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m
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ed

, and 










 /2121
 mm
s
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ed
.  From the second order 
condition for cost minimization, 0/1  me  and 0/2  se .  It can be shown that 01 

se
, 
02 


me
, and 02 



.  If 01 



, then 0
d
ed m  and 0
d
ed s . 
                                                 
9 Samuelson (1983, Chapter 8) has a more detailed discussion on stability. 
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The interpretation of Proposition 3 is as follows.  The effort of the manager is determined 
by the marginal cost and marginal benefit of exerting effort.  When   changes, the marginal cost 
does not change since   does not enter into the cost function.  From (4), there are two effects on 
the marginal benefit: one direct effect and one indirect effect through se .  One interpretation of 
(7) is that the prior information is relatively accurate.  When (7) is valid, for the direct effect, the 
marginal benefit of higher effort from the manager increases with the value of  .  For the 
indirect effect, a higher   decreases the effort of a subordinate and increases marginal benefit for 
the manager.  Thus, when (7) is valid, the two effects work in the same direction.  As a result, the 
effort level of the manager increases with the ability of the manager.  When (7) is not satisfied, 
from the direct effect, marginal benefit decreases; and from the indirect effect, marginal benefit 
increases.  The two effects work in opposite directions and whether the effort of the manager 
increases with the ability of the manager or not depends on which effect is stronger.  Impact of a 
change of   on the effort of a subordinate can be illustrated in a similar way. 
The following proposition shows that a more open manager exerts a lower level of effort 
and increases the effort level of subordinates. 
 
 Proposition 4: If the number of subordinates is exogenous, 0/ dtdem  and 0/ dtdes . 
 Proof: Application of Cramer’s rule to (7) leads to 0/21 



 
s
m
ettd
ed
, and 
0/21 



 
m
s
ettd
ed
. 
 
 Since a more open manager is more likely to consult subordinates for information, the 
marginal benefit of the effort of a subordinate increases and the marginal benefit of the effort of 
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a manager decreases when the manager is more open.  As a result, the effort of a subordinate 
increases and the effort of a manager decreases. 
 Similar to the proof of Proposition 3, it can be shown that the effort level of a subordinate 
increases when the prior information is relatively imprecise.  In a comparative study of the long 
run performance of the Silicon Valley and the Route 128, Saxenian (1994, Chapter 2) discusses 
how William Hewlett and David Packard of HP in the Silicon Valley pioneered management 
styles based on teamwork, openness, and participation.  The company encouraged informal 
communication between managers and employees.  Employee benefits were generous and effort 
levels of employees were high.  Saxenian argues that this high degree of openness of managers 
to the opinions of employees contributed significantly to the success of high technology firms in 
the Silicon Valley such as HP.  A firm such as HP engaging in innovation can be modeled as the 
case that the prior information is relatively imprecise as the degree of uncertainty of innovation 
is high.  This strategy of HP may not be optimal for a firm in a mature industry.  A mature 
industry with limited possibility of innovation can be modeled as the case that the prior 
information is relatively precise.  In this case, a higher level of effort of a subordinate is less 
valuable. 
 
5. Optimal Choice of Subordinates and Precision 
In the long run, a manager may be able to control both the number of subordinates and 
control the incentives of the subordinates and thus effort levels of the subordinates.  In this 
section, we study the situation in which the number of subordinates, and the effort level of a 
subordinate, and the effort level of the manager are all optimally chosen.  We also study how the 
total cost is affected by the ability and the degree of openness of the manager. 
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The manager chooses his effort level, the number of subordinates, and the effort level of 
a subordinate to minimize the expected cost: 
)()()1( sm
smm
eCnteC
pnp
ta
p
taV 





.         (8) 
The first order condition for the optimal number of subordinates is 
0])/[()( 2  smss pnpptaeC  .           (9) 
 In addition, equations (4) and (5) are still valid.  From equations (4), (5), and (9), we get 
the following system of three equations defining three variables n , me , and se  implicitly: 
0
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 Differentiation of (10)-(12) with respect to n , me , se ,  , and t  leads to 
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 Let   denote the determinant of the above coefficient matrix.  Since 0/1  nV , 
0/2  meV , and 0/3  seV , it is clear that 0 . 
 The following proposition provides a sufficient condition for the number of subordinates 
consulted to decrease and the effort of the manager to increase with the ability of the manager. 
                                                 
10 Equation (11) is derived from (4) and (9).  Equation (12) is derived from (5) and (9). 
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 Proposition 5: When precisions are endogenously determined by effort, a sufficient 
condition for 0/ ddn  and 0/ ddem  is that mp  . 
 Proof: Application of Cramer’s rule to (13) leads to 



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.  From (11), a sufficient condition for 0/2  V  is that (7) is 
valid.  From (10), 0/1  V .  If 0/2  V , then 0/ ddn  and 0/ ddem . 
 
 As discussed previously, if (7) is valid, the marginal benefit of effort of a manager 
increases with the manager’s ability.  Thus, the effort of a manager increases with his ability.  An 
increase of the ability of the manager has two effects on the choice of the number of 
subordinates.  If (7) is valid, the two effects work in the same direction and the number of 
subordinates decreases with the ability of the manager; if (7) is not valid, the two effects work in 
opposite directions and whether the number of subordinates decreases or increases depends on 
which effect is stronger. 
Similar to the proof of Proposition 3, when the level of precision is endogenously 
determined, it can also be shown that the effort level of a subordinate does not change with the 
ability of the manager. 
 The following proposition studies the manager’s degree of openness on the number of 
subordinates consulted when effort levels are optimally chosen. 
 
 Proposition 6: When precision is endogenously determined by effort, the number of 
subordinates consulted increases with the degree of openness.  The effort level of the manager 
decreases with the degree of openness. 
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 Since a more open manager is more likely to consult subordinates for information, the 
marginal benefit of effort of a manager decreases and the marginal benefit of the effort of a 
subordinate increases.  As a result, the effort level of the manager decreases with his degree of 
openness.  As the effort of the manager decreases, from the right-hand side of (10), the marginal 
benefit of consulting one additional subordinate increases.  As a result, the number of 
subordinates consulted increases.  Comparing Proposition 6 with Proposition 1, in Proposition 6, 
the change of the effort of the manager acts as one additional channel for the degree of openness 
to affect the number of subordinates consulted. 
 Interestingly, the effort level of a subordinate is unaffected by the degree of openness of 
the manager.  The reason is that the leader can choose both the number of subordinates and the 
effort level of subordinates.  For a given number of subordinates, the marginal benefit of effort of 
a subordinate increases with the degree of openness of the manager.  Since the number of 
subordinates increases with the degree of openness, and a higher number of subordinates 
decreases the marginal benefit of effort from a subordinate, the two effects cancel each other and 
the equilibrium effort level of a subordinate is not affected by the degree of openness of the 
manager. 
 Similar to the proof of Propositions 5 and 6, it can be shown that a higher level of prior 
precision decreases the effort level of the manager.  The impact of better prior information on the 
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number of subordinates consulted in ambiguous.  The effort level of a subordinate is unaffected 
to the level of prior precision. 
For the rest of this section, we study the impact of a change of the ability or openness of 
the manager on the value function as defined in (8).  The following proposition studies the 
relationship between the total cost and the ability of a manager. 
 
 Proposition 7: Total cost decreases with the ability of the manager. 
 Proof: Application of envelope theorem on (8) leads to 0/ ddV . 
 
 Proposition 7 is consistent with common sense that a more able manager is more 
desirable.  From equation (8), the ability of a manager affects the total cost through two 
channels: the direct channel through itself and an indirect channel through the effort level and the 
number of subordinates because the effort level and the number of subordinates consulted are 
affected by the ability of the manager.  The impact of the direct channel is that the total cost 
always decreases with the ability of the manager.  Because the impact of the indirect channel is 
not straightforward, it is not immediately clear that the total cost always decreases with the 
ability of the manager.  When the effort level and the number of subordinates are optimally 
chosen in equilibrium, the impact of the indirect channel vanishes.  As a result, the total impact is 
that total cost decreases when the ability of the manager increases. 
The following proposition studies the relationship between the value of total cost and the 
degree of openness of a manager. 
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 Proof: Application of envelope theorem on (8) leads to 
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 The interpretation of Proposition 8 is as follows.  If a  is small, 0/ dtdV ; If a  is large, 
0/ dtdV .  Compared with the cost of exerting effort, when the value of decision loss is 
relatively low, it is better not to consult a lot of subordinates to save cost to induce the efforts of 
subordinates.  When the value of decision loss becomes high, consulting more subordinates 
becomes more desirable.  Also from Proposition 8, it is more desirable to have a more open 
manager when the prior information is not very accurate, or when the estimation of the manager 
is not accurate, or the estimation of a subordinate is accurate. 
If the potential level of decision loss is positively related to a manager’s position, 
Proposition 8 shows that for important positions, it is more important to have more open 
managers.  This result is consistent with casual observation that the amount of resources spent on 
finding a manager increases with the importance of the position.  For example, recent 
presidential races in the United States cost hundreds of millions of dollars. 
When the stake involved is high, it is desirable to have a leader that is both capable and 
open.  However, we usually may not be able to have leaders with both merits.  Being open can be 
more valuable than being capable.  The following story recorded by Sima Qian more than two 
thousand years ago may be useful in illustrating this point.  Liu Bang competed with Xiang Yu 
for the rule of China.  Xiang might be the best individual fighter at his time.  Xiang’s ability was 
demonstrated splendidly in the Julu War with the Qin government.  In that decisive war, Xiang 
ordered his soldiers to destroy all boats after crossing the river to show commitment to fight 
hard.  Though Xiang had many able followers, he was not open to the opinions of his followers.  
Liu was not good at leading an army but he was good at listening to the opinions of his followers 
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and famous of using incentives to motivate his followers.  Some highly talented individuals left 
Xiang and joined Liu after they figured out that Liu was more open to the opinions of followers.  
Even though Xiang had a much larger army than Liu initially, Liu finally won the competition 
and became the founding emperor of the Han Dynasty. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 In this paper, we have studied a model in which a manager needs to make a decision 
based on the information available.  A more able manager has a higher level of precision of the 
estimation of the parameter needed for decision making.  A more open manager is more likely to 
consult followers for information.  First, when the levels of precisions are exogenous and the 
manager chooses the number of subordinates optimally, we show that a more able manager 
consults a lower number of subordinates.  The number of subordinates consulted does not change 
with the degree of openness of the manager.  Second, when the number of subordinates is 
exogenously given and the levels of precisions are determined by effort level, a sufficient 
condition for the manager’s effort to increase and the subordinate’s effort to decrease with the 
ability of the manager is that the quality of prior information is relatively good.  When the 
manager is more open, the effort of the manager decreases and the effort of a subordinate 
increases. 
Third, when the number of subordinates and the levels of precisions are all optimally 
chosen, a less open manager exerts a higher level of effort.  A higher level of prior precision 
decreases the effort level of the manager.  When prior information is relatively accurate, the 
number of subordinates consulted decreases with the ability of the manager and the effort of the 
manager increases.  Finally, a more capable manager is more desirable.  When the decision stake 
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is low, it may be profitable to choose a less open manager to save the wage cost paid to 
followers.  When the quality of prior information is relatively low, a more open manager is more 
desirable. 
 There are some interesting generalizations and extensions of this model.  First, in reality 
charisma is frequently viewed as an attractive aspect of a manager.  It is possible to incorporate 
charisma into this framework.  Suppose there are many projects.  The profitability of a project is 
unknown and individuals have different precisions in their estimations of this profitability.  
Suppose one individual has a more precise estimation of the profitability of projects than others.  
If this individual believes a project will be profitable, this individual may appear to be 
enthusiastic to this project.  This enthusiasm can be viewed as charisma.  Thus, it may be rational 
for individuals with less precise estimation to follow those enthusiastic ones or people with 
charisma.  Second, selection of managers can be studied.  In this paper, the designation of a 
manager is not addressed.  In reality, managers can be chosen through various ways.  One is 
related to the previous discussion through a reputation of charisma.  Another one is a process of 
tournament.  Is it more likely that a more able individual will win the tournament and become the 
manager?  Not necessarily.  As pointed out by Lazear (1989), to win a tournament, individuals 
may also engage in sabotage activities, rather than just choosing productive effort levels.  It is 
not always true that a more able individual is also better in sabotage activities.  Finally, different 
merits of a manager may have different values under different scenarios.  For example, the 
ability to make a decision in a reasonable amount of time may be more important in emergency 
than in a routine time period.  How the environment affects the merits of managerial decision 
making may be an interesting avenue for future research. 
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